Central Asia and US foreign policy under Trump

As geopolitical tensions escalate and global power dynamics shift, the role of Central Asia in United States (US) foreign policy remains a critical yet frequently overlooked component. Historically, the US engagement in the region has been shaped by security concerns, counterterrorism efforts, and strategic competition with major powers such as China and Russia. With the return of Donald Trump to the White House, questions arise regarding whether Washington will recalibrate its approach or continue a pattern of sporadic engagement. Given Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy track record, skepticism abounds as to whether his administration would commit to a long-term strategy or merely engage in opportunistic manoeuvres with little lasting impact.

Since the collapse of the erstwhile Soviet Union, Washington has sought to promote democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. However, these objectives frequently took a backseat to more immediate security concerns, particularly in the post-9/11 era. Counter-terrorism efforts and regional stability became the primary focus, curbing extremist threats but simultaneously neglecting broader economic and diplomatic engagement. Over time, this narrow security-centric approach has ceded economic opportunities and political influence to other actors, particularly China.

During Trump’s first term, US policy toward Central Asia lacked consistency and coherence. Unlike previous administrations, which maintained diplomatic outreach, the Trump administration deprioritised the region. This created a vacuum that allowed emerging players, such as Turkey, along with China and Russia, to deepen their engagement. China, in particular, capitalised on Washington’s disengagement by expanding economic ties through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Today, Beijing is the largest trading partner for most Central Asian nations, offering infrastructure investments and financial aid that far exceed US commitments. Trump’s ‘America First’ rhetoric and his administration’s retreat from multilateral diplomacy meant Washington failed to counterbalance Beijing’s growing influence.

Recognising the evolving geopolitical landscape in Central Asia, the Biden administration sought to renew US focus on the region, particularly in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. With Moscow increasingly preoccupied with Ukraine, Washington intensified its diplomatic efforts to strengthen ties with Central Asian nations. Under Biden’s leadership, US objectives expanded beyond traditional security concerns to include clean energy initiatives, climate change mitigation, and the sourcing of critical minerals.

A significant milestone was the first-ever C5+1 summit between the US and Central Asian leaders in September 2023, which laid the groundwork for deeper collaboration. This was followed by the inaugural meeting of the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue (CMD) in February 2024, hosted by the US department of state. These engagements signalled a shift toward a broader, long-term strategic vision for Central Asia.

A second Trump administration is likely to reassess Central Asia through a lens of economic self-interest, focusing on resource extraction, trade routes, and strategic competition with China. While economic incentives, strategic competition, and energy security may shape this approach, the likelihood of a well-structured and sustainable long-term policy remains doubtful. Instead, Trump’s foreign policy tendencies suggest a preference for transactional engagement, characterized by short-term deals, minimal diplomatic investment, and a lack of strategic vision.

Trump’s protectionist economic policies and past trade disputes raise concerns about whether he would genuinely prioritise economic partnerships in Central Asia. His administration has historically preferred bilateral trade arrangements over multilateral agreements, which may not align well with the interests of Central Asian states seeking broader economic integration. Given the unpredictability of his policies and the potential for abrupt diplomatic shifts, the region’s leaders may hesitate to engage deeply with the US under a Trump presidency.

Despite potential opportunities for increased US engagement, several challenges remain. Central Asian nations continue to maintain deep security and economic ties with Russia, which is likely to push back against any perceived US expansion in the region. Additionally, while Washington has historically promoted democracy and human rights, Trump’s foreign policy has deprioritised these issues in favour of economic deals. This could further limit US influence, as regional leaders may see little incentive to shift away from their existing partnerships with China and Russia.

Furthermore, Trump’s first term was marked by high turnover in key diplomatic positions, weakening policy continuity and long-term engagement. If this pattern repeats in a second term, it would further diminish the effectiveness of US strategy in Central Asia. In contrast, China’s presence in the region has been characterised by consistent engagement, long-term economic projects, and infrastructure investments through the BRI—elements that have strengthened Beijing’s foothold in the region.

Trump’s first term featured an aggressive stance against China, a policy likely to persist in a second term. Central Asia plays a crucial role in Beijing’s strategic and economic ambitions, particularly as a transit hub for the BRI. If the US aims to counter China’s growing influence, it must offer Central Asian nations viable economic and diplomatic alternatives. This would require Washington to commit to sustained diplomatic efforts rather than short-term transactional agreements.

The region’s leaders are eager to diversify their partnerships, balancing their relationships with China and Russia. However, without a coherent long-term strategy from Washington, the US risks losing further ground to Beijing’s entrenched economic and political presence. Simply adopting an anti-China posture without presenting a compelling alternative will likely yield limited success.

As the global order undergoes significant shifts, Central Asia remains a crucial yet underappreciated element of US foreign policy. A second Trump administration would likely bring an inconsistent approach, driven by economic pragmatism but lacking the diplomatic vision necessary for sustained influence. While the Biden administration has made strides toward a more comprehensive regional strategy, the extent to which a future Trump presidency would build upon or dismantle these efforts remains uncertain.

If Washington seeks to establish a lasting presence in Central Asia, it must move beyond episodic engagement and transactionalism. The region presents significant opportunities for the US in terms of economic partnerships, strategic positioning, and counterbalancing Chinese influence. However, these opportunities can only be fully realized through a coherent, long-term strategy rather than short-term manoeuvres.

Ultimately, the trajectory of US-Central Asia relations under the second Trump administration remains uncertain. Whether Trump chooses to recalibrate Washington’s role in the region or continue a pattern of neglect and unpredictability will determine America’s ability to compete in one of the world’s most strategically significant arenas.

This article is authored by Pravesh Kumar Gupta, associate fellow (Eurasia), Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi.